

8026.7 60  
A  
D E F E N C E

OF THE

Letter from the Dutcheſs of M——b *K*  
in the S H A D E S,

To the GREAT MAN.

Addressed to the

P U B L I C,

In ANSWER to

The MONITOR's Two PAPERS,

Of the 23d and 30th of JUNE, 1759.

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*Plura enim multo homines judicant, aut odio aut amore, aut  
cupiditate aut dolore, aut lætitia aut spe, aut timore aut  
aliqua permotione mentis, quam veritate & evidentia.*

Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.

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L O N D O N:

Printed for S. HOOPER, at Cæſar's Head, the  
Corner of the New Church in the Strand.

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M. DCC. LIX.

O. E. D. H. E.

in the SHADES.

To the GREAT MAN.

Added to the

## ERRATUM.

Page 18. l. 16. instead of *had already*, read *afterwards*.

2 W E R 13

The M. O. Two PAPERS.

Of the ... of ... 1750.



1. *Leaves* - small, opposite, ovate, entire, 1/2 to 1 inch long, 1/4 to 1/2 inch wide, green above, pale green below, with a distinct midrib and secondary veins.

L O N D O N :

Printed for S. Moore, at Carter's Head, the  
Council of the New Church in the Strand.

31 DEC 1961

( 2 )

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DEFENCE  
OF THE

Letter-writer from the Shades.

**I**F silence was not, with too many, liable to pass for an inability of replying, certainly the Monitor's attack of the Letter from the Shades needed not to have provoked this address, in defence of it, to the public. The public will of itself undoubtedly judge both sides of the question by those infallible criterions, truth and the utility of that truth, neither of which can escape its penetration where they really exist, nor can be supplied by any art where they are wanting. The dust a writer vainly attempts to throw in the eyes of the public, only blinds himself. Those readers whom no violent prejudice, no implicit party-connections, nor any passions rob of their liberty of judgment, may, on their own actual, or at least easily attainable knowledge, satisfy themselves on which side there is the least falsity, and consequently the least danger of their own inducement into error. They will easily discern which of the two writers gives

B

the



the fairest state of things; which of them least deceives or is deceived; which of them, in short, manifests most of the calmness of reason, least of the warp of prejudice or of the absurd obstinacy of humor.

THE Monitor to the two papers in which he has honored the Letter from the Shades with his strictures, has prefixed the same motto, "*Smite a scorner, and the simple will beware.*" But is not this declaring, in some sense, that he looks on the SIMPLE as the property of the party whose cause he defends, and accordingly apprehends the invasion of the scorner; whose scorn however can never be supposed to be levelled at the simple, for whom he must rather be sorry, but purely at whoever imposes on them? in which sense, and a most just one it is, he is rather their avenger than their invader.

THE Monitor introduces next his design of chastizing the scorner with a definition, of the which being a just one, I am not entirely clear. "*A scorner is one that attempts to pervert the meaning and intention, and to degrade the actions and person of every object of his resentment.*" Now I hope it is not a cavil to



to observe that *resentment* does not here follow *scorner* with the utmost propriety. A sentiment of scorn, one would think, instead of implying *resentment* naturally excludes it. At least to judge by my own feelings it is so. Scorn for the same reason appears to me yet less compatible with such an "*implacable hatred*," as the Monitor, without the least shadow of a reason, imputes to one who never connected the idea of hatred, or indeed scarce any other idea than that of pity, with the great man to whom he alludes, and of whom the letter-writer would think it almost as great a shame to be the enemy, as the admirer.

As to the charge against the prolocutor in the Shades, for "*a treatment which claims its settlement in Billingsgate, and rages with the fury of Moorfields*." Besides observing that Scorn is rarely in a passion, and that the distinctive character of it is rather a determinate coolness, the best answer is a fair appeal to the letter itself.

BUT waving any thing so insignificant to the public, as the defence of any points only personal to the letter-writer, I proceed directly to those which affecting, as they evidently do

the interest of the public, it becomes even an indispensable duty to leave as little excuse as possible for any error or uncertainty about them.

And here the reader is previously, and for his own sake entreated to suspend any prejudices he may have, that may interfere with his own search of truth; that is to say, if he is sincere with himself in the search of it. Let him reserve his indignation for those who attempt to mislead him in a concern so sacred as the interest, or rather the salvation of his country, in the present most critical conjuncture: but surely he can never distrust the candor of a writer, who so far from desiring any faith or confidence in what he says, neither expects nor wishes for any weight, but what the purest truth may give him, and even that truth less of his own pointing out, than of his putting the reader into the way of discovering it himself; which he can hardly miss, if beginning with a just distrust of his own self, he tears the bandage of partiality from his eyes, and restores himself to the use of them.

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THE Monitor seems very angry with the letter-writer for expressing doubts unfavorable (not to the justice of the Prussian cause; into a discussion of which he does not in the least enter) but to the procedure by which his P—n M—— has made himself so many enemies amongst the powers of Europe. A procedure which, if his cause was a good one, was only so much the more impolitic, for that it was what his greatest enemies would the most have wished, and their wish they have had. But who is it that condemns his measures? the Austrians, the French, the Russians, the Swedes, &c. All these are his declared enemies: they are Anti-Prussians. True; they are so. But can the Elector of Hanover well be called an Anti-Prussian? and yet that elector himself, by his minister at the Diet, solemnly disowned, *detested* and made a merit of having dissuaded his P——n m—— from his invasion of Saxony. It is true, that three days afterwards he was solemnly recommended as the *proper* ally of Britain, and no doubt the Monitor can, if he pleases, assign a satisfactory reason for such an inconsistency. But, in the mean time, it is to be hoped he will excuse a private subject, who  
on



on the strength of so great an authority as that of his own sovereign, takes upon him, if not to detest, at least not to approve of that irruption into a protestant electorate. Perhaps none could more deserve the appellation of Anti-Prussians, than those who advised that measure, in which his P——n M—— would have, it is likely, more consulted his own permanent interest, if he had had the magnanimity to withstand the temptations of a temporary pillage, and subsistence at the expence of an oppressed neighbour.

THE particulars of that irruption and its consequences, it would be superfluous to specify now. All Europe knows them. In Britain alone they seem either to have been a secret, or to have been only seen in a light obscured by passion or interest; there could not else have been two opinions about them. But even had not every day been marked with some fresh horror; what must that procedure be, that Hanover itself detested in a power with whom it was so closely linked? but nothing would open eyes so obstinately shut as ours against the most glaring light. Britain unhappily took side, and by thus becoming a party, divested her own voice in favor of Prussia, of  
all

all weight, all respect. As a mediatrix, she might possibly, in the end, have done him some service. As an ally, she could only do him mischief. Her subsidies might encourage him to brave out a while the confederacy of so many powers against him; but surely it will not be denied even by the most Prussia-mad, that the probability was against his wearying out or conquering them all. His victories could at the same time that they the more exasperated matters, only encrease the necessity of combining the more strongly to crush him. And, in the mean time, whatever was odious in his cause or in the conduct of his cause, fell in course upon the ally who aided him to support it.

ONE would naturally too conclude, that the princes of Germany must know the nature of his cause, and the tendency of his pretensions as well as they can possibly be known here. They must also have as great an interest in knowing them, as we. They are his peers, his natural judges. Amongst them there are many protestants, or members of the evangetic body; there are near relations, even to brothers-in-law. Are all these sold or enslaved to Austria? or can hardly one of them be named amongst

amongst them, who are not against him; unless indeed those who are in the actual pay of Britain for not being so, or who expect to be bribed but for standing neuter? observe too the difference between those states who have declared against Prussia, and those who take part with him. The first so far from receiving money, are compelled by the laws of the empire to furnish troops at their own expence, or in lieu thereof, pecuniary contingents or Roman months. This, in quality of members of the empire, bound by their oath of allegiance to the empire they absolutely could not refuse, even if their own private opinion, which is undoubtedly independent of leave from his Prussian majesty their fellow-subject, had not led them to oppose a prince, who in his treatment of Saxony, of Mecklenburgh and other protestant states, could not well dispose them to think the subversion of the Germanic constitution a compliment very eligible to pay him. There was no appearance at least of his being a better master than the one, whom the laws had already set over them, and who, in this quarrel does not seem to have taken any step, but in exact subordination to those laws.

As all these are to be considered as  
 bound to one and the same law, and  
 in  
 signature



IN what then have we a right to accuse those princes of corruption, or of being at once so profligately base and foolish, as to sacrifice their own religion, independence, laws, properties and liberties to Austria? on the other hand, must not the immense remittances we make to the Prussians, Hanoverians, Hessians, Brunswickers, Buckeburghians, &c. to enable them to maintain a cause against the *declared* sense of the German empire, rather look like corruption, at least to those German princes, who are not so infatuated with Prussia as we happen to be? or can they be blamed for not thinking it either a very just or a very amicable part in us to enable him to brave out those laws of their country, of which themselves are the natural judges and defenders; and to treat them, who are his equals, as if they were accountable to him for their loyalty, though they oppose him on no principles but what the laws prescribe, and in the very manner and form dictated by those laws to which himself is no more than their fellow-subject? Is his being by mere accident, and solely against his inclination, an enemy to France, any excuse to them for Britain being directly or indirectly an enemy to them, who have never

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given

given her the least provocation, and who, on the contrary, ever wished her welfare? can it be right in Britain to do for him what that Act of Settlement (so unhappily quoted by the Monitor) so wisely, tho' so vainly provided, against her doing for her own sovereign, if in quality of a continental prince, he should be involved in continental embroils, and which disposition must be yet more strong against her interfering, if in quality of member of the empire he was involved in a contest with the jurisdiction of it.

AND here as I have mentioned the impropriety of Britain's taking part with her sovereign, in the case of his being involved in a continental embroil, to obviate the cavil, I readily bespeak, of the present embroil in which Hanover is unhappily involved, not being properly speaking a continental one, but owing to its connexion or unity of subjection to one identical sovereign, I readily grant that the quarrel was not originally a continental one. It is not hard to see how the flames of war could catch from the banks of the Ohio to those of the Weser. The French who knew Britain was not so easily vulnerable in her insular situation, had the meanness to menace Hanover, without the least  
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provocation, or other invitation, but its known and very natural dearness to the British sovereign. In this light the cause of Hanover endangered by his great tenderness for it, was, if not very popular, a very just and honorable reason for considering Hanover as a near ally, whose wrongs and injuries were our own. Hanover then enjoyed, not only the due regard of this nation, but its right of protection from the constitution of Germany. There were no German princes to whom the cause of attack from France would not have appeared in its true light of meanness and injustice. Had even the emperor been so impolitic, so little a friend to the greatest interest of his family, that if not suffering France to dispose of the fate of provinces in Germany, the very laws of it, urged by the whole community of the states of the empire, on the legal complaint of Hanover, would have either forced him to procure it relief or redress, or to have openly declared himself an enemy to the peace of the empire; in which last case, the princes of Germany would have known very well what to have thought or done.

HITHERTO then it is very plain, that Hanover was in full possession of a rightful cause.



Quarrel with France it had confessedly none, on its own account. Upon this footing, it might have rested, if not in full security from the unjust invasion of France, at least sure of its title ultimately to indemnification, both through the efforts of Britain, and the exertion of laws of the empire to procure it.

THEN it was that its alliance with Prussia fatally intervened and spoiled all the fairness of this prospect, by detaching Hanover from the great stem of the empire, and making it cleave to a branch of it, and that branch not of the soundest appearance. And here the reader is desired to use his own remembrance of those public facts which could hardly escape himself; and which must greatly determine his own judgment of the propriety of dragging Britain into the adoption of a cause so extremely foreign and pernicious to her as that of Prussia, even granting it a just one.

WHEN Hanover was thus shamelessly threatened by France, it was very natural for its sovereign to look out in time for the most likely method of defending it. The blame would have been if he had omitted so just a precaution. Austria was obviously then the power

power from whom such a defence might have been expected. The emperor was under a double engagement to protect it, both as a province of the empire, and as subject to the sovereign of a nation from which his family had lately experienced so cordial a disposition, and such a willingness to repair as much as was in her power the wrong done the house of Austria, by that fatal peace of Utrecht, which will certainly never be mentioned amongst the obligations of that family to Britain. But unfortunately for Hanover, unfortunately for Britain, unfortunately for the emperor himself, Prussia was in the way. Whatever might be the emperor's inward disposition, favorable or unfavorable to Hanover, most undeniably evident it is, that the very worst office he could have done to Hanover, and to the interest Britain took in Hanover, would have been his declaring himself openly against the French. Even the Monitor himself will hardly deny so apparent a consequence as that, on such a declaration, France would have immediately closed with Prussia, who desired no better than an alliance with her. The neutrality then which Austria affected was, in fact, the utmost kindness to this nation, whatever might be her reasons for it. In the mean time to  
take

take away her excuse for that neutrality by removing or lessening her fears, true or false, of Prussia, and at the same time to provide a defence for Hanover, (for Hanover must not be forgot) the British court negotiated the Russian alliance, of which the capital article was the march of a considerable army into the empire, so that at least, if the calling the Russians into the empire was any fault, it was Britain that, in this war, not only gave the first idea, but as far as in her lay, realized it by a solemn treaty for it.

BUT in this famous treaty there is one remarkable point to which the community of Britain either seems to have little, if at all attended, or not to have allowed it its due weight in favor of poor Saxony. The point is this. That very treaty was obviously and well understood to be levelled, against whom? even against the king of Prussia himself, by his now dear ally Hanover; yes! that Hanover to whom the king of Prussia is, it seems, according to the Monitor, "*tied by the sacred bonds of religion and kindred, as well as interest,*" and yet this "*threefold buckler*" did not hinder, but that the dominions of Prussia were by that very treaty pointed out as the theatre



theatre of the first operations of the Russians, whose subsistence-money from Britain was to cease on their setting foot in those *hostile* territories. If Prussia then, who with his usual sagacity got intelligence of this treaty, if Prussia, who could not help seeing the drift of it, had then, in consequence thereof, fallen upon Hanover, and served it exactly as he has served Saxony since, he might not indeed have been entirely defensible, entirely proper in such a procedure, but he would have had ten times the reason to alledge in his justification, than for invading and treating Saxony as a conquered country, by way of punishing it for a treaty himself confesses never to have existed but in embryo, in the INCLINATION of its sovereign. Whereas that of the British court with Russia had received all the necessary authentication of forms.

PRUSSIA however had, at least, now a just handle for representations to Hanover; representations the more likely to have weight, from the armed force with which that prince was so ready, and was never known unwilling to back them. The distant and precarious march of the Russians, appeared then not only an object of less efficacy towards the  
defence

defence of Hanover, but even very dangerous to insist on it, in opposition to a prince whose power to punish Hanover for its rejection of that protection, (which however he never gave it) was immediate. Britain implicitly, as usual, obsequious to the suggestions of Hanover, adopts this change of system, and by that means totally alienates from her Russia, the empress of which pitied our levity, and disdaining to change with the same facility as so nobly marks some of our ministers, did not conceive herself bound by a treaty into which she had entered purely as an enemy to Prussia: and undoubtedly for her resolution not to be his friend, she owes Britain no account: or perhaps could give us at least as good a reason for it, as we can do for our alliance with him.

IN the mean time, after Britain had embraced that connexion, what could the queen of Hungary think or do but what she did? and here do not let any one have so mean an opinion of his countrymen, as to imagine that truth has any thing to dread from their justice and good sense. They cannot but know, they cannot but feel that the more generally unpopular a truth is, the less to be suspected of

of unfair design, or self-interest is the person who dares to propose it. It is only for false patriots to propagate a deception, or to wish the continuance of it. The true well-wishers to this nation will even at the hazard of displeasing, so they do but hope to serve the public, contribute their aid to open its eyes on an imposition. The greatest truth is always the greatest interest of the community. Without then a fear so dishonorable to the public, as would be that of incurring the suspicion of being its enemy, in the very act of defending its greatest interest, it may be safely averred that the queen of Hungary was infinitely more to be pitied, than to be blamed for running into the arms of France. None better knows than that queen, the permanent systematical perfidiousness of the French court. She could not well be the bubble, though forced by circumstances into appearing the bubble of all those fine cant-words, *moderation, love of peace, &c.* which must be even forfeiting, considering who they come from; a prince who having taken warning by his predecessor's ill-success in bullying, employs more dangerously the art of fair speeches. Austria must know that France was more to be dreaded as a friend, than as an open enemy, whose

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blows



blows in that character could neither be so well-meditated, nor so effectual as under the mask of friendship. Yet well knowing this, what could she do in the imminence of her danger from her mortal enemy the king of Prussia, and in the case not only of our desertion of her, but of our closing with that mortal enemy? — she might, it will, nay, it has been said, have accepted the truce offered her for two years, in lieu of the solemn treaty of peace actually existing between them, and unbroken in her side, at least, in fact, if not intentionally. Very true: she might so. She might have given Prussia that satisfaction which he wanted to extort from her, at the head of an army that had already invaded her ally, and began its operations against herself. But are we the judges, whether it stood either with her dignity to give him a satisfaction that most certainly she did not owe him, or with her interest to change a permanent treaty of peace, into a temporary truce, which tying up her own hands for that time, left his at liberty to fall upon her allies, to crush Saxony, or attack Russia? neither, for the regulation of her conduct, could she have recourse to Britain for councils, since it was but too plain that Britain had herself no councils of her own;

own; and the queen might not perhaps see in the Hanoverian ones so much to admire as Britain did, that seemed so compleatly guided by them.

BUT admitting that the empress-queen was in the wrong, for not truckling on this occasion to his most gracious majesty of Prussia, was that a reason for our making a common cause with him, and noing her with a treaty of alliance, in which Britain had not the shadow of an interest of her own, unless that can be called her interest, affording France an excuse for intermeddling, where she never wishes for a better game than to intermeddle in German quarrels. Called in to the help of one party, she gains strength against all. How much of the roundness of dominion she has gathered, is owing to her insidious interposition, let those provinces of which she has dismembered the empire attest. Well then might the French king in a public manifest, insult this nation with her wretched politics, in doing that for him, which all his own arts for so many years could not before effectuate, the procuring him the advantage of the queen of Hungary's alliance. This he was wise enough to prefer to those schemes of Prussia,

were his refusal, and into which we so readily came. Thence it is that we see France plausibly on the side of a power armed with all the solemnity of the laws; Britain most lamentably on that of a prince, at least under the scandal of the breach of them. But is this the fault of Austria? was it her desire that we should make an alliance, which would drive her into that dangerous part she has taken? gratitude is so well known to have little or no interest in the hearts of princes, that the weakness of trusting to it is, in general, more laughed at than pitied. Princes look on political services to require nothing more than a political gratitude. But here gratitude is quite out of the question in a measure dictated by an irresistible necessity aggravated by resentment. And certainly those who were the authors of that necessity are to bear the blame, not those who yielded to it. Austria saw no alternative, but dishonor or ruin staring her in the face: and in that dilemma it was surely more natural for her to make trial of an antient enemy, than either abjectly to submit, or fall tamely by the hands of a new power, who owed so much to her family, and who had taken the advantage of her deep distress, under color of the antiquated and  
long



long dormant claim he had on that occasion trumped up, to wrest one of her richest provinces from her. If Britain then had never deserted the cause of Austria at the peace of Utrecht ; if Britain had never compelled her to abolish the Ostend company, though she afterwards acquiesced in the Prussian one of Embden ; if she had never suffered Silesia to be torn from her, as if Austria had not, without such a loss been already too weak to balance France, if in short Austria had all, and ten times more obligations to Britain than has been pretended by those who rail at her the most ; what would such a consideration be, but even a reason the more for her joining with France, upon her being deserted by a nation, on which she had so much cause to rely, and must be so much the more bitterly disappointed, in that her natural and old support's failing her, and even combining against her with her most formidable and capital enemy ? Fear and resentment are two powerful impulses. And to say the truth, that singular and unaccountable house of Austria has now fully shewn how much stronger her passions of fear, pride and resentment are with her than even her interest. When her securing the succession to the crown of Spain de-

pended

pended on her stationing or putting into a readiness for action less than twenty thousand men, either her indolence or her ill-timed parcimony hindered her from executing that measure. In a war entered into by the grand alliance, chiefly for the advancement of her interest, she never furnished but tardy or deficient quota's. And now since despair and resentment have connected her with France, the world sees what a number of troops she can raise, and what resources she can find, even when she might be supposed so much the weaker for the dismemberment of Silesia; even after more than one defeat. In short, no measure perhaps would have been so wise, as that of having nothing to say to Austria, always provided we had also at the same time kept clear of another alliance, which, bad as that of Austria was, was still the least eligible one. This is easy to demonstrate.

BUT I must previously entreat of Mr. Monitor, in respect to his own candor, to cancel the title of which he is so liberal, that of Anti-Prussian, and substitute that of True-Briton, unless he means by Anti-Prussian, whoever is not Prussia-mad. I fancy by this time, his Prussian majesty himself is pretty clear

clear, that they were not the ill-wishers either to his country or to himself, who were sorry to see him run headlong into those measures which are honored with the Monitor's approbation. Possibly, after all his victories, other sentiments than those of sheer moderation would incline him to be satisfied with being left no worse than when he sat out on playing the conqueror, which has reduced him to that extremity, that, according to the Monitor, is so glorious an one of "*fighting for his existence.*" Many of his dearest, nearest relations might be called Anti-Prussians, if their not having the highest opinion of his procedure was to render them liable to that appellation. But, since when is it a mark of enmity to deplore the conduct of one conceived to be hurrying on to ruin? is not the flattering him in it infinitely a greater mark of malevolence? surely the king of Prussia would despise the encomiums lavished upon him by those who lavish them only because they vainly imagine he advances an interest which they woefully mistake for their own. None, in fact, deserve the honor of praising so great a prince, but those who have at the same time enough of the spirit of justice respectfully to note his imperfections. He was greatly to be



be commended for recalling the laws of his country, to the natural simplicity of justice; but that did not authorize him to new-model the constitution of the empire, or give it sword-law. His cultivation of military discipline deserved all the applause and even imitation of other powers, but would it not have been better for him, and for mankind, if he had been more scrupulous about the destination of the strength produced by it? he has done himself the pleasure and honor of loving, protecting and encouraging the arts and sciences; happy! if he had let the true spirit of them, the spirit of benevolence, humanity and moderation direct and controul the dispensation of his power; in the course of which, had many things he has done, been done on a side not imagined to be ours, what a different construction would they have born with us? what colors would have been thought black enough to paint them? but without denying him any thing of that great and shining merit, which to deny, could only dishonor the person who should deny it, it may however be safely averred, that his alliance with us was a very improper one, politically speaking, on both sides. Yes, Mr. Monitor, a very improper one, and to yourself

self for the truth of this it is appealed in the following question, which you are desired to answer fairly and dispassionately to yourself.

ON the commencement of the war, which you cannot deny was with none but France, was Britain singly and by herself a match for France, or not?

IF you answer that she was a match, I heartily agree with you. I sincerely believe that the superiority of our marine more than compensated any supposed inferiority of our land-forces, and that by a dexterous dispensation, especially of our naval strength, we might soon have made France sick of the contest, even if she had had no continental embarrassments nor diversions. In short, there is no appearance of Britain's not having had where-with in her own natural power, to measure arms with France, without despairing of a favorable issue. This might even be demonstrated, if it was requisite here to be demonstrated. In this case then, may it not be fairly asked, what occasion there could be to clog, and (with pardon for the expression) to unsimplify the national system, by the adscititious incumbrance of a foreign ally, whose

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cause

cause had not a single point of community with ours, no, not even, at first, of enmity to our enemy? for the rupture of Prussia with France, was posterior to those our first engagements with Prussia, into which Prussia would probably have never entered, if he had foreseen a REAL rupture with France. Could it then be eligible for us, without having the excuse of a dreaded superiority, to change a single war into a double one; to hire, at an immense expence, a prince's battles against an antient friend, who was even guilty towards us of no fault on earth, but that of not closing with us, out of fear of that very individual ally with whom we were connecting, and of not declaring for us, at the very juncture when such a declaration would have been apparently of the greatest disservice to us; to link ourselves, in short, needlessly with an ally, from whom every thing was to be feared, and nothing to be hoped?

BUT, on the other hand, if you answer, that Britain was not herself a match for France, you will run into yet a more gross and palpable absurdity, should you from thence infer the propriety of the Prussian alliance. It cannot indeed be denied, that if that inferiority should have



have been the case, it afforded a just excuse for looking out for allies to supply the deficiency of national strength. It is the obvious policy of all nations so to do, under an apprehension of superior force in an enemy. The folly would be to neglect such a precaution. But surely it must at the same time be granted, that if a nation's presumable weakness is a good reason for seeking an ally, it must yet militate stronger against the choice of such an ally, as so far from bringing any supplement of strength, must encrease that very weakness : by draining her of the money and forces necessary to the carrying on more effectually the war upon her own bottom ; by converting so many of her former friends, allies, or at least well-wishers into enemies, as must out-balance the succours of an ally so circumstanced and so situated ; and especially, by the nature of his cause, which was from the very outset palpably such as that his victories must not only the more closely unite confederates, whom nothing else was so likely to unite ; but should those victories have proceeded, or were to proceed, must, instead of wearying out, multiply his enemies to such a point, as to bring on a declaration, against him and his abettors, of their being the common enemies of Europe. Was

this then a continental connexion for a violent declaimer against continental connexions, to except out of his general proscription; or for him to add new links to those he found already unfortunately made?

Now, Sir, I leave this dilemma to your own consideration and decision whether the force of it can be eluded by any thing but the rankest sophistry, or by such cavils as prejudice, humor, party-spirit, or obstinacy, not less silly than unavailingly catch at in their untriumphable war against the powers of truth, reason and common-sense; and especially against the interest of this nation. You have already begun a real victory in your confession "*that it would be better for Britain, were there no necessity for our interfering between the Belligerents on the continent.*" Crown it by acknowledging, not only that no such necessity did exist from the commencement of the war, but that, even if it actually did exist, we could not have taken a side more pregnant with all disadvantages to the national interest, than what we have done. And acknowledge this you will, if yielding to the inward convictions of your own knowledge and

reason, you will restore to your judgment its just authority over yourself.

CAN, for example, any thing on earth be clearer than the consequence to be drawn from the Monitor's own just definition of the ballance of power to be "a *ballance in favor of liberty, against the aspirings of France towards universal monarchy.*" That the house of Austria, being as much, or even more immediately interested than Britain to oppose her, ought not, in any good policy, to have been disgusted by an alliance so fit to drive her into the arms of France? and for what? to answer no one British purpose on earth, but the vain and imaginary one of its being an immediate protection to Hanover; which (N. B.) it never did protect, and may not possibly be the cause of it's ultimate destruction, as well as of that ballance, the pretence of preserving which has already cost Britain so many millions in waste. And a pretence that ballance may be justly stiled, since it has, at least, oftener than not served for one, in the vague and indeterminate sense in which it is applicable to every impertinent squabble on the continent. Who does not know that "*the ballance is in danger;*" was constantly the cry, whenever the

the



the scheme was to take the troops of favorite foreign dominions into pay, being recommended as the only buckets pure and handy, to quench any flame kindled in Europe. And though no such flame could be kindled as would not less directly, or later threaten us than any of the powers, whom, on those occasions, we have officiously courted, solicited, nay, rather than fail, liberally paid for their leave for us to defend their religion, their liberties; what have been the thanks? what the grateful return we have met with from some, but to be called at least, busy, pragmatical meddlers, who for the sake of some of our men of power paying a compliment to Hanover and all its train of relations or needy dependents, did not care how much the peace of Europe was disturbed, what enemies we should make, or to what expences ourselves were collaterally put? Such has been, such is the temptation to embark in continental connections. Upon what then could eloquence have ever been better employed than in remonstrating against them; or when worse, than as lately in recantingly defending an adherence to them, or at least, to those, from which there is now so little likelihood of being disentangled, till the utter ruin of one party, and perhaps of both

both, shall, like death, forcibly dissolve the mis-alliance?

THE multitude, it is true, countenanced the connection with Prussia; but it is as true, that it was not so much from want of sense to decide upon the nature and consequences of such a measure, if they had examined it, as from their too lightly crediting gross misrepresentations, from their not being aware of insidious suppressions of truth, and especially from their implicit confidence in one, who had certainly not deserved it. But apt as the people are to be carried away by first impressions, in which sound must ever have a great prevalence, where they do not give time for sense to interpose its representations, in the hurry they are in to decide in favor of any opinion that flatters their inclination; those powerful words, "*an enemy to France! — the pre-  
testant hero! — the butt of a popish conspi-  
racy;*" and the like, supported by some fortunate events in war, operated that infatuation for which Britain will probably, one day, have so much to reproach the authors of it, whenever her feelings of the consequences shall put her on entering thereon into judgment with them, and herself. She cannot then but be sensible that

that, for those whose care her welfare ought to have more effectually been, not to resist that torrent of vulgar prejudice, was a misprision of error, in its consequences, scarce short of a misprision of treason : but that to have contributed to the formation or establishment of it, must, to say no worse, have been one of the meanest, silliest abuses of authority to a most unnatural purpose, and that purpose, alas ! a most vain and self-defeating one.

In the mean time, the people, for their deserving so much better in that love of their country, which has been the much abused principle of their credulity, were not only the more cruelly, but the more easily deceived. How could they suspect an opinion which came recommended to them, at once, by so respectable a virtue as that of patriotism, and by a professor of patriotism on whose sleeve they had pinned their faith ? what, after all, was Prussia to them, any farther than as they were made to believe him the friend of their country, and the champion of their cause ? but if that same professor, whom, without very well knowing why, the people have so greatly delighted to honor, had, from a newly adopted suppleness of compliance

with



with the court-passion, any share in deceiving them, what a figure must he make as a patriot? if he was himself deceived, like the meanest of the mob, by the momentary flash of a few unsubstantial successes, which to the thinking and impartial never appeared, but as so many omens of his perdition, what a figure must he make as a statesman!

BUT whether Mr. Monitor's *Great Man* was the deceiver or the deceived, that only makes the better or the worse for himself. To the public it is all one. Whatever was his motive, the money and troops were equally sent to Germany. If power really changed hands, (for some will have it that it only changed names, and that the m——r so confidently said to be supplanted, ever kept, and still keeps, in all essentials, undiminished sway) at least it is certain that measures have not changed, unless from bad to worse. The public before saw the old driver dozing over slackened reins, and now sees the pretended new one driving indeed more desperately, and raising more dust to blind people, but still not one step out of the very same road of perdition.

F

Now

NOR is it surely begging the question to call that system of politics, a road of perdition, which does not only threaten ruin to this nation, but to the foreign province to whom that ruin will have been a compliment? is there a Hanoverian that has not reason to dread the consequences of those politics? is there a Hanoverian that has not even reason to wish that a count Bruhl had effectually preponderated in both the royal and electoral councils? had his Anti-Prussian, or rather patriot opinion prevailed, Hanover could have been at the worst but ravaged and oppressed like poor Saxony. But like Saxony it would then have had the compassion of all Europe, and its right of redress from those laws, in contempt of which it would have been ravaged and oppressed. But as it is, political justice is likely to prove in the end more severe to it than even poetical justice. For if Britain has been the sacrifice, Hanover has already been, and may it not again be, at once, the idol and the victim!

Mr. Monitor severely taxes the Letter-writer from the Shades with accusing his Great Man of adopting a German interest to secure his

his post. If that Letter-writer has said any such thing, he is certainly doubly in the wrong.

FOR, in the first place, in the measures complained of on the behalf of Britain, nothing seems to be less the *German interest* than they are. It is even, if possible, more an Ungerman than an Unbritish interest. May it not in the end prove to have been no other than purely a French one !

IN the second place, nothing could bid less fair for *securing* his post than such measures ; though they were probably made the indispensable condition, very fillily accepted, of his getting into it again.

IN the mean time, Mr. Monitor will hardly cavil at the measures themselves of sending money and troops to Germany, being called German ones, unless he should plead that Hanover was not in Germany, but in Terra Australis incognita ; or that the Prussian quarrel with Saxony, the empress-queen, the empire, &c. was originally, what it is devoutly to be wished that it had never been made, a British one.



BUT to whom but the most ignorant of mankind, or the arrantest drivellers, must Mr. Monitor think he is addressing himself, when he, with a little air of triumph, discovers (pag. 1234) that the writers in the shades must have "*drowned their ideas of things above, in the waters of Lethe; or that they could not have forgot that the French, Russians, Swedes, and even that army of Pandours, &c. sent from Hungary, are excluded from interfering in the quarrels of the German princes, by the constitution of the empire, as much as the king of Great Britain and Prussia; and that every prince in Germany has a right to repel force by force; and consequently that the allies of Great Britain cannot incur the ban of the empire, except the allies of France be also involved in the same punishment.*" So that, according to Mr. Monitor, a man must have lost his memory, before he could aver that to appear on the side of the laws, and to appear on that against which the laws are evidently armed, is *not* the same thing. If this reasoning of Mr. Monitor's should be good, the emperor, the poor elector of Saxony, the oppressed duke of Mechlenburgh, and all the princes who have presumed to give their free votes at the diet against the Prussian procedure,

ture, are palpably in a state of contumacy and rebellion against his Prussian majesty ; for which they must be put to the ban of Prussia, for the Empire will hardly put itself to the ban.

MR. Monitor has also played off the old stale exploded trick of lugging religion into the quarrel, and represents his Prussian majesty's arms, as "*most gloriously employed to pre-serve the existence of the evangelic body, which is the only balance to popery in the empire.*" But is not this enough to surfeit any one, who knows that the very first state surprized, attacked, pillaged, was the most antient protestant state in Europe, and so thoroughly protestant, that its popish sovereign's example had not made the least impresson on it, and therefore surely the more deserved the tender protection of a protestant prince ? Sweden, Mechlenburgh, and other protestant states, had, it is plain, no idea of this being a religious war, notwithstanding the quotation from a minister's letter, found in the right-royal closet-rummage of Dresden. But granting his P——n M——y to be the most religious prince alive, granting that he invaded the protestant electorate of Saxony, purely for the greater glory and advance-

vancement of the protestant religion, and that in the defence of the evangelic body it was, that he took some extraordinary liberties with so many of its members; still is it not rather to be apprehended, that the very worst office which could be done the protestant religion, to say nothing of the impiety of making such a stale of it, must be the dragging it into a question where it had originally so little to do? the issue of war is uncertain, and the torrent of events often involve in their violence things entirely foreign to the bottom of the quarrel. Thus the protestant religion, which it is so impudently and ridiculously false to rank amongst the causes of the present war in Germany, may, in the course of its incidents, be very seriously drawn into danger. But will not that be obviously the fault of those who first brought it into play, and thereby give its enemies a pretext to confound it with the original cause of war? every one knows that bigotry is the strong characteristic of the ever priest-ridden house of Austria; and though policy may for a while have prevailed over its superstition, and engaged it to keep measures with the protestant princes in its interest, it may justly be feared, that what with the natural disposition of that house to persecution, what



what with the stimulation of the popish clergy, Austria may, should the issue of the war give her the power, employ it in the destruction of the protestant religion. So much then is that religion the less obliged to those who by taking its name in vain, have furnished its enemy a handle to make it accountable for such a procedure in one of its professors, as nothing can be farther than that religion from authorizing. But should ever the house of Austria be mad or silly enough to attempt the restoration of superstitious tyranny, it may be hoped, that even the Roman-catholic princes will for their own sakes effectually remember that the establishment of the Germanic liberties, and of their own independence, was entirely owing to the stand made by the members of the evangelic body against the ambition of the house of Austria, whose slaves they would, in all human probability, every one of them have at this day been, without that equally the bulwark of religious and civil liberty, the Protestant Religion.

PAGE 1238. Mr. Monitor asserts, that from our enabling Prussia to find employment for the money and troops of France, it follows, that "*so much of the force and treasure*  
" of

“ of France, as the Prussian war draws into  
 “ Germany, so much that common enemy is  
 “ weakened in her efforts against Great-Bri-  
 “ tain.” To the which there are but two  
 objections.

THE *first*, that it is so false that France is  
 weakened in her efforts against Great-Britain  
 by the Prussian diversion, that it is demon-  
 strable, that the pretext afforded France for  
 interfering in the German quarrel, is absolutely  
 the only chance she had of ultimately pre-  
 vailing against Britain ; and to Britain it is  
 she is principally beholden for that chance.

THE *second*, that this position of Mr. Mo-  
 nitor's is the very position which France is ac-  
 tually now, and has been long trying to pass,  
 most impudently false as it is, in all the courts  
 of Europe, by way of obtaining their influence  
 for accomplishing a peace in due time upon  
 her own terms.

IN support of the first objection, to that  
 French plea of France being weakened by  
 the Prussian diversion, there needs only to  
 be observed, that she has already in her own  
 hands pledges of an indemnification for her  
 suc-

succours to Austria, beyond the value of all that she has yet furnished, or of all she has yet lost, even supposing Canada actually added to her losses. To say nothing of Minorca, those two ports, Ostend and Nieuport, which assure her of the rest of Flanders, assure her of a country that for ages has been the object of her ambition; of a country, the advantage of which, though so little to Austria that she will be the more likely to be indifferent about abandoning it to her, is of such evident importance to France and big with such danger to Britain, that even that indolent pensioner to Lewis the fourteenth, Charles the second, was, on the alarm of its falling into his hands, roused into spirit enough to declare that he would himself take the field, rather than suffer it. Yet of that country France is already in the presumptive possession. But what is worse yet, that is but one of the ill-consequences of the Prussian diversion to Great Britain. The greatest, and what we are the most in danger of feeling, is France's gaining that superiority on the continent, with the consent of the powers of it, as she could never have had the impudence to hope but for the general obnoxiousness of the Prussian cause, which we have so unfortunately made



our own, and that will arm her with such matter of clamor against us, as we may be sure she will make the most of, whenever a treaty of peace shall come upon the carpet. Is this, Mr. Monitor, one of those gloomy reasonings "unconceivable by the light of *superior* reason, and contradicted by *facts*?" But in the name of that *superior* reason of yours, what could France have wished for better than that, besides the general odium we must incur, by adopting a cause given up by most of the powers in Europe, we should contribute to the opening to her a plausible theatre of war in the very spot of her own choosing; where alone she could act to any valuable purpose for herself, and where the men and money we should send, must weaken ourselves without the least rational prospect of advantage over her? You expressly, Mr. Monitor, grant us the superiority upon our own element, the sea, and at length, in America; and you will not surely deny, unless you do not care what you deny, when you perceive it tends to make against any opinion you may have adopted, that that superiority was susceptible of augmentation. If so, need any efforts that France could threaten us with at sea, or singly opposed to us, wherever we

were

were accessible, have frightened us into so false a measure, as that of involving ourselves in a continental war? Would not those immense treasures shipped off to Germany, had they been appropriated to the demands of more national measures, have added to our naval force in proportion to any supposable encrease of the French one? Or since we had such a surplusage of money to spare from the national uses here, had not that valuable part of the nation itself, the American colonies, a more natural and even a more political right to it than countries foreign to us? Countries whose destruction our treasure is evidently no better employed than to purchase, whilst it might not only have done essential service to ourselves and colonies, but in the consequences of that self-service, proved highly beneficial to those foreign countries. Might not too those troops which have been shipped over so snug into Germany have contributed by their presence here to lessen any danger from that invasion with which France has the impudence to menace us? On the senselessness or expedience of which invasion, should she realize her menace, the decision will entirely depend on Britons shewing whether they are degenerated or not from those ancestors of theirs, who

would have wished for no better sport than such an attempt of the French, and would have laughed to scorn at the very mention of the threat.

So far however from the Prussian diversion answering a single British purpose, it might, even from the first prospect of things, surely not contradicted by the present one, be maintained, that it promises in the end so much more advantage to the French, than to us; that if it was not collusively concerted between Prussia and France, as I hope and believe it was not, it might, at least, pass for having been so, without too violently wresting the construction of appearances.

To say then that Britain could NOT, singly or unaided, have done what she has done, or even more, if those her treasures and forces employed in support of the continental alliances intended to cut out a diversion for the French, had been purely appropriated to the proportional increase of her navy, to the re-inforcement of her colonies, or to the rendering more effectual her armaments against the French islands, is, at best but an arbitrary and by much the least probable conjecture. But an unquestionable reality of consequence,  
from



from those continental connexions is, the actual expences, the embarrassments, that odium so likely to produce the instability of our advantages, the numerous inconveniences already incurred, to which it may be added, that the French have already, by playing off this very plea of the Prussian diversion, begun to pave the way for their further insistence on it, and hope to borrow from the supposed effect of that diversion a color much wanted by a cause originally so foul as theirs. Thus stands however this plea, in the French king's manifest, of the parallel of his conduct with that of his British majesty. (Page 45 of the original French.)

THE king of England and his ministers  
 have done justice enough to the (French) king,  
 to reckon upon his taking part in this war in  
 quality of guarantee of the treaties of Westpha-  
 lia; from his fidelity to his treaties, and from  
 his constant zeal for the tranquillity and safety  
 of Germany, in case that those principal  
 states of the empire with whom he is united,  
 should be attacked; or that any infringement  
 of the Germanic laws and constitution should be  
 attempted: they have reckoned that by this  
 DIVERSION they would thereby DIMINISH  
 the

*"the EFFORTS which France should be obliged to make by SEA for her OWN DEFENCE against the ENGLISH."*

Now though it is certainly beneath the dignity of Britons to deny a truth, even though it should come from an enemy, no candor however binds them to admit a falshood of his coming, and much less to conspire with that enemy in giving it currency, as they do, who assert those advantages which have not yet been, nor are likely to be found in those same continental connexions. The truth and undoubted truth is, that France has already as good as got Flanders by the pretext they have afforded her, and that the great hurt we have done her by that boasted diversion, is to unbar the lists to her, which might otherwise have been shut against her, and thereby to open at land a scene of action to her, where she might do a great deal, instead of another at sea, in which she had so much less a chance to do any thing. A scene of action where she is parading it away with all the glare and dazzle of a character more properly that of Britain, when acting on a British footing that of auxiliary to the Germanic constitution, and of a deliverer from oppression. Where whatever France  
does

does employ of her force and treasure, is employed, at least, in ends which may properly be called her own : whereas all the money or troops we have sent, or can send there, are not only not for any ends of our own, but for no end at all. For surely that does not deserve the name of an end, the means used for attaining of which had, from the very first, so manifest a tendency to produce only the very opposite effect to that which was boasted of being aimed at in them. If the losses France has sustained by our reduction of Cape Breton, and of Senegal, or by our kindly garrisoning Guardaloupe for them, and add, if you please, all Canada and the Mississippi, besides the damage done to their trade and navigation, are not, even counterballanced by Minorca, by Flanders already theirs in presumption, and not impossibly by their advantages in the East-Indies, as well as by that ascendant they are visibly gaining on the continent, which subjects us to the fear of either losing all that we have got from them, or of eternizing the war with an over-powerful confederacy : France makes no small use of the supposed ballance against her, from those losses, in the plea they offer her, to deceive and throw dust in the eyes of the empress-queen. Yes ! the very  
argu-



argument which the Monitor adopts, of the efficacy of the Prussian diversion in dividing her forces, is the very argument of which France avails herself to cover her having done hitherto less than nothing against the king of Prussia, whose not being crushed, is surely the secret interest of France, if but for her considering him as an enemy to the empress-queen. Nor will France probably co-operate effectually to crush him, till she is paid, or secure of being paid for it to her heart's content; then indeed she may go about the trial of it in earnest, which it is pretty palpable she has not hitherto done. Hitherto there have appeared at least no symptoms of any very mortal enmity between the two courts of Versailles and Berlin. France was suffered very quietly to penetrate into Hanover, for any opposition made by Prussia, who left ungarrisoned that strong barrier Wesel, which stood in their way. In the rout of Rosbach the French lost a very few men, and were not very hotly pursued: Prince Soubize, in his letter to the French king, acquainted him with it in a stile, which had more of the air of exultation than of a candid acknowledgement, as if he did not expect his defeat would be the most unwelcome news in the world

world at his court. In short, without so much as insinuating that there might be a collusion between his Prussian and most Christian majesties, so far is certain, that the interest of France could never be to destroy him, unless for a very valuable consideration indeed, which from whence ever taken, must always be to our detriment, so far as it will aggrandize France. It is also as certain, that the game of France being to see the German princes weaken themselves by cutting one another's throats; there could be no handle that she would more greedily seize than any to throw the blame upon us for our abettorship of the side, which had at least the chapter of appearances against it. Those losses then, which with her inferiority at sea, it is reasonably presumable, even if she had had no collateral diversion of her "*treasure and force*," she might equally have sustained, not only afford her plausible matter of exculpating herself to Austria; but are precisely what she already sounds so high at those courts, whose interest and power it may avail her to engage for procuring a restitution of our conquests; and it is well, if her known modesty will restrain her from an insistence on costs and damages besides.

H SHOULD

SHOULD it then even appear that "*the British*  
 "*arms, by sea and in America, have been more*  
 "*effectually employed, and reaped more glorious*  
 "*success, since our union with Prussia, than*  
 "*within any one period of our late wars before*  
 "*that alliance.*" What would that prove?  
 it could only confirm what every man of sense  
 and true lover of his country before said, that  
 the sea and America were our natural theatres  
 of action, and that in them lay the fairest prospect  
 of *glorious* success, procurable by British valor  
 exerted on a national footing: but a success  
 which is so far from being obliged to the  
 Prussian connexion, that the most probable  
 presumption is, that France might have even  
 lost more than she has, if she had singly  
 measured her force at sea with us, or risked  
 in the teeth of our squadrons the transport of  
 greater re-inforcements to America; and that  
 whatever advantages we may have gained by  
 our naval superiority, or in America, will, in  
 consequence of that same blessed "*union*"  
 with Prussia, be liable to a necessary restitu-  
 tion, under penalty, on refusal, of being con-  
 sidered, perhaps declared and treated as the  
 common enemy of Europe; of that Europe,  
 of whose liberties we used in happier times to  
 be



be honored as the defenders ; a character we seem now to have exchanged for that of protectors, IN VAIN too ! of two or three German provinces. And what much better could Britain expect from suffering herself, in the midst of a war all her own, to be betrayed by pretences of which the motives were so easily penetrable, into a measure so unnational as that of burthening herself with another cause so circumstanced, so foreign to her ? how ungratefully too to that insular situation, in bestowing the inestimable advantage of which, nature so strongly points out to her, that every consideration of safety, honor and interest, is on the side of keeping to her character of judge or arbiter of all the quarrels on the continent, without ever making herself a party in any of them, unless evidently forced into it. But in this dispute, especially between Prussia and Austria, there appear, at least, incomparably more reasons against her involving herself, than in any that the whole stream of history can furnish.

BUT if the Prussian "*union*" has not yet produced, nor is likely to produce, in haste, very great advantages to Britain ; to whom has it been of service ? not to Hanover surely.

That electorate, for whose benefit it was specially intended, has, I will not say with the connivence, but apparently in defiance of Prussia, already undergone one pillage, and is not absolutely out of fear of a second. But if Prussia could do so little service to Hanover, its contiguous neighbour, it could do Britain yet less, with all its diversion. Has even the king of Prussia himself much to boast of the benefit of this union? There is but too much reason to fear that he has not. The career, in which it might encourage that great prince to continue, is not yet finished. And though from the transcendent abilities both of himself and prince Ferdinand it may be presumed that they will burst forth again in some great and victorious strokes of war, human kind indeed may suffer, but Prussia will hardly be the nearer forcing his enemies into a peace. The chance seems against him in that dreadful alternative, which, if it is not his fault, it is his misfortune to have created, and by nothing so much as by his successes, of the necessity of crushing, or being crushed by him. There appears hardly room for a middle expedient; since the fixt determination, Europe, in general, shews to have taken up, not to acknowledge him in the splendid character he

has

has assumed of Deliverer of Germany, which Germany so many powers however will have it, falsely no doubt, to be under no oppression but his own. What then can be thought of an "union" by which parties have all suffered, or are likely to suffer; of an union, in short, by which it is so probable that none will reap, in the end, a greater advantage than France herself, against whom it is pretended to be concerted! Once more, may this conjecture not be verified by the event!

MR. Monitor says, that "to expect a peace, which should be honorable and lasting, by giving up the king of Prussia, the Protestant Religion, and the German liberties, is inclining to madness." Perhaps the greater madness was in our first assuming the character of their defenders, under the appearances there were against us. But certainly Mr. Monitor is right in his averment, that it would be madness to think of obtaining "a safe and honorable peace," by giving the king of Prussia, &c. up. The point to be feared is, that it is out of our power to gain such a peace at any rate; to gain any thing, in short, by giving him up; or to prevent our losing every thing by supporting him, even if support him we could,



could. The impolicy of the choice of such a second, in our quarrel, may have been become irreparable, but that does not surely afford matter of panegyric on him, or those to whom its being irreparable may be justly imputed.

THE greatest civilians agree, that when it is plainly discerned, that the forces of two or more combined states are not able to make head against their common enemy or enemies, no-one of them is bound by any treaty of alliance to expose itself to certain ruin, in endeavouring to second the unavailing efforts of the others. In such case, the supreme law of self-preservation dictates the compliance with that prior implicit compact by which every government is so indispensably bound to prefer the interest of its own subjects to that of any foreigners whatever. But to the unspeakable concern of the well-wishers to Britain, her dilemma is so perplexing, that, morally speaking, she can neither drop nor maintain her capital ally, to her advantage, nor even to his. Her support of him seems however, of the two, to threaten the being the most ruinous to both. But this is a discussion which would require too long a deduction of reasons

reasons on both sides to enter into the plan of this reply.

IN the mean time can it answer any valuable purpose, to abuse or depreciate those powers who did not cease to be the friends of Britain till long after Britain had ceased to be a friend to herself? There are, for example, few Britons who, knowing any thing, but must also know that our trade to Russia is highly beneficial to that country. But does that authorize the saying, with Mr. Monitor? "*that the grandeur and* "VERY EXISTENCE *of that empire are owing to* "the PROTECTION *of this nation.*" May it not be averred, that such boasts might date with propriety, if not from "Billingsgate," at least from "Moorfields," or rather perhaps from Gascony. In short, from the empty bravades and blusterings which of late pass so current, to the supplanting of reason and common sense, one would imagine there were ten thousand Captain Flashes in the air.

EVEN Sweden, that respectable nation, who with a spirit which Britain, in her admiration of it, would once have proved her deserving to claim for the British one, has asserted herself into liberty, and erected a free form

form of government upon the ruins of that despotism, under which herself had been brought to the verge of destruction; even the Swedish nation, I say, cannot escape partial invective for the Anti-Prussian part she has taken; though perhaps no nation has more patriot causes to shew for it, nor more deserves to be greatly pitied, if it be true, that her king should unhappily have, or rather imagine that he has any interest separate from that of his kingdom. In the mean time, the very purchase of Bremen and Verden for Hanover from Denmark, at a season when the distresses of Sweden compelled her to ratify that bargain, might rationally account for her indispotion towards Britain, without looking for the cause of it in French gold; so much of which has so often been saved to France by British blunders. It is pleasant enough however to hear the reproach to one nation for her being a pensionary and receiving, in shape of subsidies, money from a foreign court, come from another nation, who herself stands accused of infinitely a more shameful corruption, that of being bribed with her own money to her own perdition.

HERE



HERE in the just fear of growing tedious, by superfluously pursuing the refutation of so many self-refuted arguments, as I might proceed pointing out in those papers of the Monitor herein undertaken, I gladly leave to whoever may have perused those arguments the easy task of pronouncing on their justness or degree of validity.

As to that writer himself, I can safely protest not only my respect for his talents in that character, but my concern on marking the injustice he does them, in converting his former honorable employ of them in the enlightening his country and defending her interest, to that of contributing to rivet the deception of her, and, in course, her destruction. Of this however, for his comfort, he may be sure, that the shutting his own eyes never so hard against the real truth of things will hardly prevent others from opening theirs; may it not be too late! too late for the real untainted patriots, the neutrals clear of all party-spirit, to open a cruzade, with success, against those worse than foreign invaders, those domestic paviours of the broad way to invasions and ruin, the united powers of Corruption and

Folly, those two evil geniusses of this island, employed in connecting her to the continent, and co-operating, like Sin and Death, when, as they built, over Chaos, a bridge of communication between the terrestrial Paradise and the Bottomless Gulph, the one cemented the other's work.

BUT for a sample of the candor or truth with which the public is treated by the advocates for the present "confusion, worse confounded" of all our political measures; it is to every reader who knows any thing at all of the light in which this nation is considered abroad by the impartial part of universal society, by whom alone she can be rightfully judged; to every reader who knows any thing of the actual condition of public credit so wretchedly attempted to be supported by false spirits, and quack-cordials of fiction and flattery, to whoever, in short, is competently acquainted with the real state of things, that the consideration is recommended of the following paragraphs, which conclude the two papers of the Monitor, professedly designed to chastize the scorner, and expose his MISREPRESENTATIONS!

IF

" IF NATIONAL GLORY ; if the sovereign-  
 " ty of the seas, if the dignity of the British  
 " flag (*does he mean in Germany?*) if the  
 " TERROR of our ARMS ; if the PROSPECT  
 " of an opportunity to recover our just rights  
 " and property, and to put it out of the power  
 " of the enemy to disturb our peace ; be pro-  
 " per marks of a wise and resolute admini-  
 " stration, we cannot point out ANY TIME  
 " when these BLESSINGS more EVIDENTLY  
 " discovered the WORTH of a minister, and  
 " the HAPPINESS of a nation than at THIS  
 " TIME in Britain. ALL nations COURT OUR  
 " FRIENDSHIP, (*I was afraid not*) DREAD  
 " our power, and acknowledge our superi-  
 " ority. We protect the INNOCENT, relieve  
 " the DISTRESSED, and revenge the cause of  
 " RELIGION and LIBERTY."

" THESE FACTS will wipe off every false-  
 " hood, calumny, malice and effect of par-  
 " ty-spirit ; and leave lasting impressions  
 " upon a disinterested and even upon an en-  
 " vious mind, in favour of that GREAT  
 " MAN, whose enemies not being able to



" stand before the JUSTICE of his actions  
 " (*it is plain here he had no hand in breaking*  
 " *the Convention*) and despairing of their in-  
 " trigues to lessen him in public esteem,  
 " have sought a retirement in the dark re-  
 " gions of *the shades*, where they vent their  
 " implacable hatred without fear, and with-  
 " out effect upon the INTELLIGENTS of those  
 " who are born to do HONOR and BR-  
 " VICE, and wish well, to their king and  
 " country."

NEEDS this quotation any further com-  
 ments? no! they would be an affront to the  
 reader's own knowledge and understanding.  
 He cannot but even by them be sensible  
 which is the *misrepresenting* side. And as to  
 the merits of the GREAT MAN therein al-  
 luded to; to proceed any farther on the discus-  
 sion might have the air of a rancorous in-  
 sistence, the spirit of which is so foreign, so  
 unknown to genuine truth and reason. I  
 shall only then venture to form one wish,  
 to which the candor with which I form it  
 makes me hope even Mr. Monitor's *Amen*;  
 and that is, that this country may entertain  
 just that opinion of the *Great Man* which  
 he

he deserves of her, or which it is for her  
 greatest interest to have of him! forms  
 (In the mean time, if he has in him a grain  
 of that capital ingredient in the composition  
 of a truly great man, good sense, he must  
 be infinitely less offended with salutary, tho'  
 perhaps unpalatable truths should they even  
 be, what however, in this case, there is  
 no sign of their being, the produce of  
 enmity, than with that nauseous glut of  
 panegyrics, for the strain of which, the hint  
 seems to be taken from the scene in *the*  
*Rehearsal*; where those two profound politi-  
 cians and usurpers of the throne of *Brent-*  
*ford*, king Ush and king Phyz, the one a  
 courtier, a thing of form, the other a state-  
 quack, being both of them *united*, though, as  
 Mr. Bays accounts for it, pretending for the  
better carrying on the plot, not to *know* one  
 another, lay their *heads* together to *secure*  
 their power, and one of them compliments  
 the other in the style, of which the speci-  
 men is here subjoined for the benefit of its  
 admirers.

“ SIR, to conclude, the place you *fill* has  
 “ more than amply exacted the talents of a  
 wary

" wary Pilot; and all those threatening  
 " forms, which, like impregnate clouds,  
 " hover o'er our heads, will (when once  
 " they are grasp'd but by the eye of REASON)  
 " melt into fruitful showers of BENEDICTIONS  
 " on the PEOPLE."

of a truly great man, be infinitely less attended with luxury, and  
 perhaps dissipated mirth should they even  
 be: what however, in this case, there is  
 no sign of their being the produce of  
 enmity; than with that malicious spirit of  
 panegyric: **F I N I S** seems to be the end of the  
 Address; which is a profound politi-  
 cian and shapers of the throne of Britain  
 Jew, king Uzziah and king Pnyas, the one a  
 country, a thing of form, the other a state-  
 quack, being both of them wits, though, as  
 Mr. Bayes accounts for it, pretending for the  
best carrying on the plot, not to know one  
another, lay their heads together to secure  
their power, and one of them compliments  
the other in the style, of which the speci-  
men is here shewn for the benefit of its  
admirers.

" Sir, to conclude, the place you fill has  
 " more than amply exacted the talents of a  
 way



